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ABSTRACT
For decades, the relationship between the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and patent law’s doctrine
of inequitable conduct has resembled that between
Shakespeare’s Prince Hal and John Falstaff. The former
recognizes the excess, the deservedly ill repute, even the at
least occasional wickedness of the latter, but cannot tear
away from his close companion. Likewise, for decades,
Federal Circuit judges have criticized the excesses of the
defense of inequitable conduct, which can render a patent
unenforceable as a result of misrepresentation or
nondisclosure to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Nevertheless, U.S. patent law remains wedded to the
defense’s existence. Without a real option of repudiating
the defense, the Federal Circuit has instead sought to guide
and confine the defense’s application in hopes of advancing
legitimate aims at acceptable social cost. In this effort, the
opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit written by Chief
Judge Randall Rader in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co. figures prominently. The background,
content, and prospects for the Federal Circuit’s legal
rulings in Therasense are the focus of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Why dost thou converse with that trunk of humours,
that bolting hutch of beastliness, that swollen parcel
of dropsies, that huge bombard of sack, that stuffed
cloak-bag of guts, . . . that grey Iniquity . . . ?
—Prince Hal in Henry IV, Part 1 1
For decades, the relationship between the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and patent law’s doctrine of
inequitable conduct has resembled that between Shakespeare’s
Prince Hal and John Falstaff. The former recognizes the excess, the
deservedly ill repute, even the at least occasional wickedness of the
latter, but cannot tear away from his close companion. Likewise,
for decades, Federal Circuit judges have criticized the excesses of
the defense of inequitable conduct, 2 a defense that can render a
patent unenforceable when, in applying for the patent, the
prospective patentee made a material misrepresentation or
nondisclosure to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with
specific intent to deceive. 3 In language resonant of Hal’s fusillade
1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 1 HENRY IV 2.5, ll. 409-414, in NORTON
SHAKESPEARE 1187 (S. Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997).
2
See David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945,
946 & n.6 (2010) (“The Federal Circuit’s recent opinions cast the doctrine [of
inequitable conduct] as a noxious weed”).
3
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense), 649 F.3d
1276, 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Inequitable conduct is an
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of insults to Falstaff, Federal Circuit judges have variously
characterized the inequitable conduct defense or its attendants as
“an absolute plague,” 4 “the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law,” 5 and a
potential cause of inequity itself. 6 Nevertheless, U.S. patent law
remains wedded to the defense’s existence despite other countries’
demonstrated capacity to do without it.7
What can the Federal Circuit do about this unhappy marriage?
King Henry V (formerly Prince Hal) ultimately repudiated
Falstaff. 8 But absent some sort of miraculous enhancement of the
Federal Circuit’s authority, that court is essentially powerless to
repudiate the defense of inequitable conduct. At least some version
of the defense is enshrined in Supreme Court precedent. 9
equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars enforcement of a
patent.”); JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 348, 431 (3d ed. 2009) (“The defense
of inequitable conduct asserts that a court should refuse to enforce a patent if it
was procured through improper conduct before the USPTO.”); cf. Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[C]lear and convincing
evidence must prove that an applicant had the specific intent to . . . mislea[d] or
deceiv[e] the PTO.”).
4
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct . . . has become an absolute
plague.”); cf. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293 (speaking of “the way inequitable
conduct has metastasized”).
5
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he remedy for inequitable conduct is
the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law.”) (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar
Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
6
McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To avoid the inequity resulting from
litigation-driven distortion of the complex procedures of patent prosecution,
precedent firmly requires that the intent element of inequitable conduct must be
established by clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent . . . .”).
7
MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 586 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that a charge of
inequitable conduct “is generally unavailable as an infringement defense” in
other countries).
8
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 2 HENRY IV 5.5, ll. 61-62, in NORTON
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1374 (“I banish thee, on pain of death, [a]s I
have done the rest of my misleaders. . . .”).
9
See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 819 (1945) (concluding that “inequitable conduct impregnated
Automotive’s entire cause of action and justified dismissal”); see also
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285 (“This judge-made doctrine evolved from a trio of
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Arguably, the defense is implicit in statutory law. 10
Without a real option of repudiation, the Federal Circuit has
instead sought to guide and confine the defense’s application in
hopes of advancing legitimate aims at acceptable social cost. In
this effort, the opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit written by
Chief Judge Randall Rader in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co. 11 figures prominently. The background, content,
and prospects for the Federal Circuit’s legal rulings in Therasense
are the focus of this Article.
I. BACKGROUND TO THERASENSE
A. Reasons for a Limited Inequitable Conduct Defense
It is not hard to understand why the defense of inequitable
conduct has been characterized as “the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent
law.” 12 Nor is it hard to understand why it is a difficult defense for
Supreme Court cases that applied the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss patent
cases involving egregious misconduct.”); 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 19.03[1] (2011) (discussing cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court
“held that fraud and inequitable conduct was a defense under the general
equitable doctrine of clean hands.”).
10
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (mandating the availability of a
defense of unenforceability “in any action involving the validity or infringement
of a patent”). While reforming the U.S. Patent Act in 2011, Congress declined to
abrogate the doctrine and instead limited the range of situations in which it may
apply. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 12(a)
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257) (enabling a patent owner to “request
supplemental examination . . . to consider, reconsider, or correct information
believed to be relevant to [a] patent” and thereby to inoculate a prior disclosure
failure against a later charge of inequitable conduct); id. at § 15(a) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282(3)) (providing that “failure to disclose the best mode
[of practicing a claimed invention] shall not be a basis on which any claim of a
patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”); cf. Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (observing that the existence of a
statutory provision providing a special defense to infringement of a business
method patent “further undermine[s]” an “argument that business methods are
categorically outside of . . . [the U.S. Patent Act’s] scope”).
11
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
12
Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525
F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
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an accused infringer to resist asserting. Even when unsuccessful,
an assertion of inequitable conduct can inflict substantial discovery
and other litigation costs on a patentee, thereby raising the cost of
seeking to enforce patent rights. 13 The assertion can also help shift
the moral undercurrents often implicit in litigation posturing and
argument, with the accused infringer no longer being solely in the
position of denying wrongdoing but also in position to accuse the
patentee of being a wrongdoer. 14 Moreover, when successful, the
inequitable conduct defense enables an accused infringer to render
an entire patent—perhaps even an entire set of related patents—
permanently and entirely unenforceable. 15 The accused infringer
13

See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009) (observing that
“litigation of inequitable conduct claims is particularly costly,” in part because
“deposition of the prosecuting attorney who handled the application is almost
always necessary,” and such a deposition implicates “complex attorney-client
privilege issues”); see also Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Foreward: Always at
the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 783 (2010)
(“An allegation of inequitable conduct open[s] the door to vast discovery into
the circumstances of the patent prosecution . . . .”).
14
See Christian Mammen, Revisiting the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct
Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1007, 1009 (2011) (“Inequitable conduct is also a popular defense
because of the litigation narrative it provides.”); cf. David O. Taylor, Patent
Fraud, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 65 (2010) (stating that “[a]llegations of
inequitable conduct also may affect juries’ and courts’ views of the merits of
other issues in patent infringement lawsuits, primarily infringement and
validity” and allegations “have a negative impact on the reputations of inventors
and patent attorneys accused of wrongdoing”). See generally CHISUM, supra
note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing, as potential consequences of “proof of fraud or
inequitable conduct,” “liability for damages under the antitrust laws,” “liability
under the Federal Trade Commission Act,” “liability under the federal securities
laws,” and “disciplinary action against an attorney or agent who is registered to
practice before the Patent and Trademark Office”).
15
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“Unlike validity defenses, which are claim
specific, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire patent
unenforceable . . . . Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and
applications in the same technology family.”) (citations omitted). In contrast, an
invalidity defense, such as an assertion that patent claims are invalid for lack of
novelty, ordinarily proceeds on a comparatively plodding claim-by-claim basis.
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might also be able to recover attorney fees 16 or to pursue an
antitrust claim against the patentee.17 Thus, in multiple ways, the
inequitable conduct defense is a way of turning the tables and
taking the “offensive” against a patentee.
Should U.S. patent law rid itself of an infringement defense
based on inequitable conduct? Should concerns with inequitable
conduct instead be addressed separately through professional
discipline or regulation of future relations between a patentee and
the USPTO? These points can be argued, 18 but as Part I suggests,
even aside from Federal Circuit precedent, both Supreme Court
precedent and congressional action or inaction indicate that the
United States will have a substantial inequitable conduct defense

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims . . . . ”); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex
Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Under the patent statute, the
validity of each claim must be considered separately.”). Hence, just because one
claim is invalid does not necessarily imply that another claim is, but if a patent
applicant has committed inequitable conduct in relation to even just one claim in
a patent application, the entire patent might be rendered unenforceable.
16
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“[P]revailing on a claim of inequitable
conduct often makes a case ‘exceptional,’ leading potentially to an award of
attorneys’ fees . . . .”); CHISUM, supra note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing “an award of
attorney’s fees” as a potential consequence of “proof of fraud or inequitable
conduct”).
17
Id. (“A finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn antitrust and unfair
competition claims.”); CHISUM, supra note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing “liability for
damages under the antitrust laws” as a potential consequence of “proof of fraud
or inequitable conduct”).
18
See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 123 (2004) (“In view of its cost and limited deterrent value the
committee recommends the elimination of the inequitable conduct doctrine or
changes in its implementation.”); Cotropia, supra note 13, at 728 (“This
Article’s main finding is that the inequitable conduct doctrine has the ability to
improve patent quality as long as the inherent tendency to overcomply with the
doctrine by overloading the USPTO with information is kept in check.”); cf.
Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 215 (2010)
(“On several occasions of late, I have been unable to resist the temptation to
introduce my remarks relating to . . . the doctrine of inequitable conduct with a
warning to the patent practitioners in the audience: ‘Get out! Get out while you
still can!’”).
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for the foreseeable future and thus that the debate is largely
academic. 19
In any event, retention of even a flawed inequitable conduct
defense is not necessarily a bad thing. Reliance on inequitable
conduct as a potentially powerful counterpunch to a suit of
infringement might plausibly be viewed as an important and even
critical part of the complicated system of checks and balances that
constitutes U.S. patent law. There is reasonable cause to believe
that an inequitable conduct defense can help correct for a
combination of limitations of that system, including:
(1) The USPTO’s limited ability to check for
deception or, more generally, to conduct thorough
reviews of all material potentially relevant to a
particular patent application’s allowability; 20
(2) The substantial incentive for deception that an
issued patent’s strong presumption of validity in
litigation 21 might provide; 22 and
(3) The likely lack, even after relevant aspects of
the recent patent reform act become effective, of
administrative procedures to challenge the validity
of another’s issued or contemplated patent rights
that are as robust as those found in other leading

19

See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
See Cotropia, supra note 13, at 753-54 (observing that patent examiners
generally “do not have ready access to all technical literature” or other forms of
prior art such as “offers to s[ell], conference presentations, test data, and product
brochures”); id. at 756 (observing that “examiners do not have the time[,
resources, or training] to independently verify all of an applicant’s statements
and claims”).
21
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011) (rejecting
contentions that proof of patent claim invalidity requires only “a preponderance
of the evidence”).
22
See Taylor, supra note 14, at 86 (“Reducing the standard of proving
invalidity for undisclosed or unconsidered material prior art would encourage
compliance with the duty of disclosure . . . .”).
20
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patent jurisdictions, such as Japan and the European
Union. 23
As long as these three features of the U.S. patent system remain,
courts and policymakers might correctly believe that an inequitable
conduct defense able to be asserted by private parties is a
necessary measure to curtail opportunistic or abusive behavior in
dealings with the USPTO. 24
In short, the existence of an inequitable conduct defense can
generate significant systemic benefits, but the defense has proven
to be difficult to manage and also to generate significant systemic
costs. How then should the Federal Circuit seek to regulate the
defense’s use? In principle, the court could take a relatively handsoff approach, leaving the doctrine’s application as a matter of
minimally guided equitable discretion, and giving district court
judges relatively free rein to apply the doctrine in individual cases.
But given the severe sanction of unenforceability currently
associated with inequitable conduct as a matter of course, such an
approach would seem to leave the defense’s application intolerably
unpredictable, raising the resulting systemic costs and defeating
part of Congress’s apparent purpose in promoting national
uniformity and predictability in patent litigation through creation
of a centralized court of appeals for patent infringement suits. 25
The Federal Circuit thus seems properly charged with trying to
23

See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 778 (2011) (suggesting that “the social
benefits of an inequitable conduct doctrine are likely to be greater in a system
like the United States’ in which opportunities for post-grant oppositions are
constrained”).
24
See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention
Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 24, 30 (2011) (describing the inequitable conduct defense as “[t]he
clearest tool of pre-[America Invents Act] patent law to discourage” a strategy
of nondisclosure of relevant information to the USPTO).
25
Daniel J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First 20
Years—A Historical View, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 557, 558 (2002) (discussing how
interest in “enhanc[ing] national uniformity in federal decisional law” helped
lead to creation of the Federal Circuit); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989)
(observing how substantial divergence in how regional circuits applied federal
patent law became a justification for creation of the Federal Circuit).
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hammer out doctrinal contours for an inequitable conduct defense
that is both substantial and limited, an effective deterrent for
prospective patentees and remedy for accused infringers that
avoids becoming too much of a vehicle for opportunistic and
abusive behavior itself.
This last task of confining the inequitable conduct doctrine
within sensible bounds is perhaps particularly hard because the
United States’ federal courts, by constitutional command, do not
work in a vacuum; they cannot focus on defining Platonic ideals or
even tracing shadows on walls. The meaning and application of
judge-made law is hammered out in adversarial litigation, in which
each side can be expected to seek to push—indeed to distend—
favorable doctrines as far as possible and necessary to suit their
clients’ ends. As a result, as Chief Judge Rader himself has
observed, a doctrine like that of inequitable conduct has a natural
tendency to become bloated as one and then another defendant
tries to establish this most desirable defense under questionably
clear sets of facts. 26 The courts might succeed in filtering out most
improper claims of inequitable conduct, but the fallibility or
different perspectives of Article III judges 27 mean that, at some
point, one or another of the weaker claims for inequitable conduct
is likely to have its day. 28 The success of this claim will then
become a precedent that later accused infringers will cite, and there
is potential for an amplified unraveling of the doctrinal constraints
that are meant to keep both the doctrine’s application and its
invocation within reasonable bounds. The resulting bloat of patent
law’s Falstaff will have again overcome any pretense of restraint.
26

See Rader, supra note 13, at 780 (2010) (“A cursory examination of the
development of inequitable conduct law . . . lends support to the notion that this
doctrine is constantly overflowing its banks.”).
27
Cf. Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit
and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293,
1351 (2011) (suggesting that Federal Circuit standards for inequitable conduct
might be difficult to enforce because “judges’ decisions on inequitable conduct
are impacted by their moral views of right and wrong”).
28
Cf. Rader, supra note 13, at 785 (observing that “litigants continually
solicit courts to rewrite or modify the law to suit their particular needs” and
courts “sometimes oblige without adequate attention to the full consequences”).
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What can the Federal Circuit do about the inequitable conduct
defense’s seemingly natural tendency toward bloat? One can
imagine at least two nonexclusive responses: (1) limiting the
defense’s application by, for example, tightening the requirements
for pleading the defense or for proving its elements; (2) limiting or
diluting the defense’s effects by, for example, enabling district
courts to provide remedies other than complete patent
unenforceability. 29 The Federal Circuit has pursued the first
course.30 The remainder of this Article will explore how this
pursuit has led up to and been embodied in the opinion for the en
banc court in Therasense.
B. Precursors to Therasense
Whatever the validity of concerns that Federal Circuit judges
lack sufficient exposure to economics or non-patent-based thinking
to have substantial responsibility for the development of
innovation-oriented law or policy, 31 among members of the federal
29

See Cotropia, supra note 13, at 774-75 (proposing various ways to
mollify the consequences of an inequitable conduct finding); Taylor, supra note
14, at 85 (“One possible reform is to return judicial discretion to the application
of remedies for findings of inequitable conduct.”).
30
The opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit in Therasense contains at
least a hint at the possibility of pursuing the second course in its statement that
“the unclean hands doctrine remains available to supply a remedy for egregious
misconduct.” 649 F.3d at 1287. Consistent with this statement, “egregious
misconduct” might provide a basis for equitable relief distinct from complete
patent unenforceability in situations where the “egregious misconduct” does not
fit the category of “affirmative egregious misconduct” that constitutes
inequitable conduct. Id. at 1292.
31
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 782 (2004) (noting
critics’ contention that Federal Circuit suffers from “a failure to properly
consider the interaction between the rules the court articulates and innovation
policy”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1106-07 (2003)
(criticizing a Federal Circuit decision for “ignor[ing] the economic reality . . .
that patents are not generally necessary as a mechanism for promoting
innovation in the area of business methods”); cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent
Law’s Uniformity Principle and the Consequences of Judicial Specialization,
100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (suggesting that Federal Circuit adjudication
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judiciary they are unusually well placed to understand how patent
law’s various constituencies are affected by the defense of
inequitable conduct, a defense that focuses peculiarly on details of
patent law practice. Concentration of patent appeals in the Federal
Circuit ensures that each Federal Circuit judge consumes a steady
diet of patent cases each year. 32 If there is a “plague” of difficultto-resolve charges of inequitable conduct, Federal Circuit judges
are, ex officio, likely to know about it.
Moreover, Federal Circuit judges gather information about
problems with the practice of patent law through other channels.
As part of an apparent effort to stay in touch with relevant patent
communities, Federal Circuit judges regularly participate in patentlaw-related conferences, speak at events organized by law schools
or bar associations, compare notes with U.S. trial judges and
judges from other jurisdictions, and make written contributions to
law reviews or bar journals. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s Chief
Judge Randall Rader—a casebook co-author,33 regular teacher at
law schools, 34 occasional trial judge, 35 and seemingly tireless
traveler to conferences, both domestic and foreign—embodies this
dedication to engagement with relevant patent communities at a
level of intensity that is virtually exhausting to describe.
One can debate whether, generally speaking, Federal Circuit
could improve if the court had a broader docket of economically oriented cases).
32
Cf. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 657, 667 (2009) (observing in 2009 that “the typical Federal Circuit judge
has participated in deciding several hundred patent cases on the merits”).
33
See ADELMAN, supra note 7.
34
GW Law – Faculty Directory, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
(last
visited
May
15,
2012),
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/
profile.aspx?id=3258 (describing “Professorial Lecturer in Law” Randall R.
Rader as having “taught courses . . . at The George Washington University Law
School, University of Virginia School of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, and other university
programs in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, and Beijing”).
35
See, e.g., PA Advisors, LLC v. Google, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D.
Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d
692 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); Performance Pricing, Inc. v. Google Inc., 704
F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 654 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rader, J.).
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judges succeed through their extra-judicial activities in exposing
themselves to the “right” cross section of persons interested in how
the U.S. patent system or, more generally, the U.S. innovation
ecosystem operates. There has long been concern that the benefits
of engagement-based expertise such as that indicated above can be
counterbalanced by the detriments of engagement-based
“capture.”36 But such concern seems substantially less salient with
respect to inequitable conduct, an issue that parties regularly and
heatedly contest before the Federal Circuit and within the
communities with which Federal Circuit judges otherwise
regularly interact.37
Of course, merely being in position to recognize problems with
the inequitable conduct defense does not ensure success in shaping
the defense’s doctrinal development. In light of the defense’s
tendency toward bloat, such success likely requires constant work.
Often, this work will occur through majority opinions, as was
ultimately the case in the 2011 opinion by Chief Judge Rader for
the en banc court in Therasense. Even before Therasense,
however, the 2008 opinion for a Federal Circuit panel in Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,38 with then-Chief
Judge Michel writing, emphasized “[t]he need to strictly enforce
the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof” for inequitable
conduct and articulated the requirement that an inference of
deceptive intent must “be the single most reasonable inference able
to be drawn from the evidence.” 39 Likewise, the 2009 opinion for a
Federal Circuit panel in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 40
36

See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice,
89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1099 (2011) (observing that “concerns of capture and
bias are normal in administrative law,” but that “[a] number of commentators
suggest that such concerns have been systematically exaggerated”); cf. Rai,
supra note 31, at 1110 (“Because capture is an obvious alternate explanation for
the [Federal Circuit]’s jurisprudence, it is important to evaluate carefully . . . this
hypothesis.”).
37
Cf. Golden, supra note 32, at 683 (observing that, in circumstances
involving “relative balance in advocacy,” “there seems, at first blush at least,
little basis for picking out a single systematic direction for capture to take”).
38
537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
39
Id. at 1365-66.
40
575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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penned by Judge Linn, operated to limit application of the defense
by embracing a relatively demanding view of pleading
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 41
But significant groundwork for the Federal Circuit’s retuning
of inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense was also laid
through a series of separate, non-majority opinions. 42 In a 2007
dissent in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical,
Inc.,43 Judge Pauline Newman complained that standards for what
constituted inequitable conduct had slipped to the point of
encouraging a new “‘plague’ of . . . unwarranted charges,” 44 and
she warned that the majority’s approach risked making routine “the
inequity [of patent unenforceability] resulting from litigationdriven distortion of the complex procedures of patent
prosecution.” 45 Almost exactly one year later, then-Judge Rader
added a dissent of his own, arguing that holdings of inequitable
conduct should be restricted to “extreme cases of fraud and
deception” 46 and echoing Judge Newman’s concerns about
41

Id. at 1328-29 (“[A]lthough ‘knowledge’ and ‘intent’ may be averred
generally, a pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include
sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably
infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or
of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or
misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.”); see
also Taylor, supra note 14, at 72 (“Exergen may represent the first foray into the
adoption of principles from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable
conduct.”).
42
The sequence of separate opinions and suggestive panel opinions leading
up to the en banc court’s decision in Therasense illustrates how even this single
appellate court can act as a “percolator” for new ideas and approaches despite
the normally ossifying effect of circuit precedent. See Lee Petherbridge, Patent
Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 428 (2009) (“The presence of
large numbers of written opinions with significantly different outcomes suggests
that Federal Circuit decisions in the area of law studied are not characterized by
irretrievably entrenched broad-rule precedents.”). But cf. Craig Allen Nard &
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1619, 1646 (2007) (observing that “intracircuit percolation does not escape
the constraining force of precedent”).
43
487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
44
Id. at 926 (Newman, J., dissenting).
45
Id.
46
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349
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inequitable abuse of this equitable defense by observing that the
defense had “taken on a new life as a litigation tactic.” 47 Judge
Richard Linn added his own significant separate opinions on
inequitable conduct both before and after his opinion for a Federal
Circuit panel in Exergen. In a 2009 concurring opinion, he
lamented that Federal Circuit precedent had come to “perpetuat[e]
what was once referred to as a ‘plague.’” 48 In 2010, Judge Linn
wrote a lengthy dissent from a decision by a three-judge panel in
the Therasense case itself. 49
Such majority and non-majority opinions are only a sampling
of the pushing and pulling, the expressions of dissatisfaction, and
the implicit invitations of attorney challenges to the status quo that
led up to the en banc court’s holdings in Therasense. After the
Federal Circuit signaled interest in a wholesale reevaluation of the
inequitable conduct doctrine in its grant of en banc review, 50 Chief
Judge Rader used a concurring opinion to deliver a further shot
across the bow by describing Therasense as intended “to address
the transformation of inequitable conduct from the rare exceptional
cases of egregious fraud that results in the grant of a patent . . . to a
rather automatic assertion in every infringement case.” 51
Moreover, communications by Federal Circuit judges came
through mechanisms other than judicial opinions. Earlier in the
same month in which the Federal Circuit granted en banc review in
Therasense, 52 an issue of the American University Law Review
featured a foreword by Chief Judge Rader suggesting that “the
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
47
Id.
48
Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring).
49
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense III), 593 F.3d
1289, 1312-25 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Linn, J., dissenting), vacated, 374 Fed. Appx.
35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
50
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense IV), 374 Fed.
Appx. 35, 35-36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (listing various questions to be
addressed in “new briefs”).
51
Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817,
835 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J., concurring).
52
Therasense IV, 374 Fed. Appx. at 35 (granting en banc review on April
26, 2010).
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Federal Circuit’s inequitable conduct jurisprudence might profit
from a renewed focus on propounding clear standards that can be
easily applied by lower courts and the public.” 53
Thus, the Federal Circuit made its way to the threshold of
reformulation of inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense. Part
II looks at what the court did upon crossing.
II. DOCTRINAL RETRENCHMENT IN THERASENSE
A. Therasense Facts
The basic facts relevant to the inequitable conduct charge in
Therasense help to put the Federal Circuit’s rulings in context and
can be described as follows. Abbott Laboratories and its subsidiary
Therasense, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Abbott”)
sued Becton, Dickinson & Co. for infringement of U.S. Patent No.
5,820,551 (“the ’551 patent”). 54 The ’551 patent contains claims
directed to “disposable blood glucose test strips for diabetes
management.” 55 The ’551 patent specifically claims a form of test
strip that tests the glucose concentration level in “whole blood”—
i.e., “blood that contains all of its components, including red blood
cells.” 56 As described in the patent’s sole independent claim, the
form of test strip claimed uses an “active electrode . . . configured
to be exposed to said whole blood sample without an intervening
membrane or other whole blood filtering member.” 57
The ’551 patent issued after a contentious, more than fourteenyear prosecution history that featured no fewer than six
continuations or continuations-in-part of abandoned applications. 58
53

Rader, supra note 13, at 785.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense II), 565 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (describing procedural history), aff’d in
part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
55
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense), 649 F.3d
1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
56
Id. at 1283.
57
U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 col.14 ll. 1-3 (issued Oct. 13, 1998).
58
See id. (showing “Related U.S. Application Data” on patent’s cover
page); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283 (“Over thirteen years, that original
54

368

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:4

Abbott was not the original owner of rights in what ultimately
became the ’551 patent. About a dozen years into the ’551 patent’s
prosecution history, Abbott acquired Medisense, Inc., the company
owning rights in the ’551-related applications. 59 A patent attorney
at Abbott, Lawrence Pope, then took over prosecution of the ’551
application and submitted new claim language that included the
requirement for a sensor “that did not require a protective
membrane for whole blood.” 60 With a supporting affidavit from
Abbott’s Director of Research and Development, Dr. Gordon
Sanghera, Pope argued that this claim limitation distinguished the
claimed invention from disclosures in a prior-art patent also
acquired from Medisense, U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (“the ’382
patent”). 61
The tricky point in Abbott’s argument was that the ’382 patent
describes “a protective membrane” for a glucose sensor that is
present “[o]ptionally, but preferably when being used on live
blood.” 62 At least to a layperson, the plain language of this
statement might suggest that the ’382 patent discloses that use of a
“protective membrane” for purposes like that associated with the
claims of the ’551 patent was already recognized as merely
“optiona[l]” and therefore not required. But Dr. Sanghera’s
affidavit contended that, upon reading the ’382 patent, a person
skilled in the relevant technological art—the relevant person for
legal purposes—“would have felt that an active electrode
comprising an enzyme and a mediator would require a protective
membrane if it were to be used with a whole blood sample.” 63
Consistent with this understanding, the skilled artisan “would not
read [the ’382 patent’s ‘optionally, but preferably’ language] to
teach that the use of a protective membrane with a whole blood
sample is optionally or merely preferred.” 64 Attorney Pope
application saw multiple rejections for anticipation and obviousness, including
repeated rejections over . . . another patent owned by Abbott.”).
59
Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
60
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283.
61
Id. (describing the affidavit and accompanying attorney argument).
62
U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 col.4 ll. 63-65 (issued Oct. 8, 1985).
63
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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similarly argued that the “optionally, but preferably” language was
“mere patent phraseology” and that a skilled artisan “would not
have read [the ’382 patent] as teaching that the use of a protective
membrane with whole blood samples was optional.” 65 Despite the
’382 patent’s plain language, the contentions of Pope and Sanghera
were apparently convincing. In the wake of these representations,
the USPTO examiner “finally approved the proposed claims.” 66
Something the examiner was not told was that, in appealing
revocation of the European counterpart of the ’382 patent in 1995,
Medisense had argued to the European Patent Office (EPO) that
the sentence featuring the “[o]ptionally, but preferably” language
was “unequivocally clear”: “The protective membrane is
optional[;] however, it is preferred when used on live blood . . . .
[T]he sensor electrode as claimed does not have (and must not
have) a semipermeable membrane in the sense of [another prior-art
reference].” 67 Given that Pope and Sanghera had needed to counter
the ’382 patent’s plain language with an affidavit about the
particular meaning that an ordinary artisan would attach to that
language, one might have expected them to recognize that an
examiner or, perhaps more to the point, a court would be interested
in prior statements asserting that the language was “unequivocally
clear.” As a matter of best practice, one might have thought they
should disclose those statements to the USPTO even if they
believed them reconcilable with their current contentions because
of differences in context, etc. But, although both attorney Pope and
Dr. Sanghera knew of these prior statements by Abbott’s
predecessor in interest, they concededly “made a conscious and
deliberate decision to withhold disclosure” of them to the
USPTO. 68
At trial, Abbott argued that the nondisclosure was immaterial, 69
and attorney Pope and Dr. Sanghera testified that they lacked
65

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
67
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis omitted).
68
Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08.
69
See id. at 1112 (discussing arguments that the nondisclosure was
immaterial).
66
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deceptive intent. 70 A key assertion was that the statements from the
EPO prosecution focused on distinguishing a “diffusion-limiting
membrane” and thus were properly viewed as irrelevant to
distinction of “blood separation membranes and filters”—
“completely separate pieces of technology” according to Dr.
Sanghera. 71 The district court disagreed and held that the
nondisclosure was “highly material,” 72 that neither attorney Pope
nor Dr. Sanghera had any “plausible reason” for their
nondisclosure, and that both acted with intent to deceive. 73 Before
the Federal Circuit’s review of the case en banc, a divided Federal
Circuit panel affirmed the district court, holding that the district
court did not clearly err in its factual findings of materiality 74 and
intent, 75 and “did not abuse its discretion in holding the ’551 patent
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.”76
B. New Rules for Intent and Materiality
If the en banc Federal Circuit had focused on resolving whether
inequitable conduct had occurred under the particular facts of
Therasense, there seems a good chance that the division of opinion
70

Id. at 1113-16 (discussing contentions of lack of deceptive intent).
Id. at 1116 (quoting Dr. Sanghera’s testimony) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
72
Id. at 1110.
73
See id. at 1113 (“Sadly, this order must find that Attorney Pope had no
plausible reason for consciously withholding the EPO submissions and that he
acted with specific intent to deceive Examiner Shay and the PTO.”); id. at 1116
(“Taking into account all possible inferences of good faith, this order concludes
that Dr. Gordon Sanghera had no plausible reason for concealing the
inconsistent EPO submissions and that he consciously made sworn statements to
the [USPTO] that were deliberately misleading . . . .”).
74
Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1305 (“The district court’s finding that the
EPO statements were highly material because they contradicted the position
taken before the PTO was not clearly erroneous and was strongly supported by
the uncontradicted record.”).
75
Id. at 1308 (concluding that “the district court was clearly correct in
concluding that the explanations offered by Pope and Dr. Sanghera were not
plausible” and that, “[a]ccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Pope and Dr. Sanghera both intended to deceive the PTO by
withholding the EPO documents”).
76
Id.
71
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evident at the panel stage might have dominated the opinions
issued after the rehearing en banc. As in many cases where
inequitable conduct is charged, there was a nondisclosure that
reasonable people might view as, at the very least, suspiciously
contrary to principles of best practice, most specifically the norm
of erring on the side of disclosure to the USPTO. 77 Add to the
violation of such norms the possibility of different understandings
of the context-specific significance of the nondisclosure and the
likelihood of decision-makers having different priors about the
probability of deceptive intent when nondisclosure or
misrepresentation occurs.78 The result is a situation in which
outcomes of the adjudication of inequitable conduct charges is
likely to be highly unpredictable, thus raising various concerns
about arbitrariness and unfairness in adjudication, potential
litigation abuse, and incentives for wasteful and possibly
distracting overdisclosure to the USPTO.
In this context, the en banc Federal Circuit appears properly to
have focused on providing general prescriptions for adjudication of
inequitable conduct charges while leaving for the district court the
task of reconsidering the specific question of how the defense
should apply to Therasense’s particular facts. 79 The general
prescriptions provided give the law a significant, non-fact-specific
77

See Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1305 (“[I]f this could be regarded as a
close case, which it is not, we have repeatedly emphasized that the duty of
disclosure requires that the material in question be submitted to the examiner
rather than withheld by the applicant.”). See generally U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2004, at
2000-10 (rev. 8th ed. 2010) (“When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit
information. . . . [T]he question of relevancy in close cases[] should be left to the
examiner and not the applicant.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1319 (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing “the familiar
adage that ‘[c]lose cases should be resolved by disclosure’” as “sage advice”
that “practitioners should take . . . to heart” (citation and emphasis omitted)).
78
Such priors might be personalized because they reflect personal
experience, relatively individualized understandings of human nature, or
relatively individualized understandings of the care and precision with respect to
which people can be expected to act during patent prosecution.
79
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1296 (“[T]his court vacates the district court’s
finding of inequitable conduct and remands for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.”).
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shove toward a leaner doctrine of inequitable conduct. And
interestingly, in light of criticism of the Federal Circuit for being
overly formalist and inattentive to policy concerns, 80 the Federal
Circuit explicitly tied this doctrinal shove to the court’s assessment
of the public interest. The majority opinion by Chief Judge Rader
explained:
Left unfettered, the inequitable conduct doctrine has
plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent
system. Because allegations of inequitable conduct
are routinely brought on the slenderest grounds,
patent prosecutors constantly confront the specter of
inequitable conduct charges. With inequitable
conduct casting the shadow of a hangman’s noose,
it is unsurprising that patent prosecutors regularly
bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art
references, most of which have marginal value. . . .
While honesty at the PTO is essential, low
standards for intent and materiality have
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences,
among them, increased adjudication cost and
complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement,
burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased
PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality. This
court now tightens the standards for finding both
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine
that has been overused to the detriment of the
public. 81
80

See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity:
The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 791 (2008)
(discussing criticism of the Federal Circuit for “[f]ormalistic case-parsing,
refusals to consider policy arguments, and reluctance to revise positions once
taken”); Rai, supra note 31, at 1102-04 (arguing that “rule-formalism that is
opaque to policy considerations . . . is a poor fit for [the U.S.] patent statute,” but
that, “[i]n several major areas of patent law decisionmaking . . . the Federal
Circuit’s approach . . . has been decidedly formalist”).
81
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289-90 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); cf. id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“There is broad consensus that
the law of inequitable conduct is in an unsatisfactory state and needs
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Tightening of the law’s intent requirement came about as
follows. First, the court’s eleven “active” judges 82 unanimously
reaffirmed that proof of inequitable conduct requires clear and
convincing evidence of “specific intent to deceive” and that “gross
negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’ standard
does not satisfy this intent requirement.” 83 Second, the Federal
Circuit judges unanimously overruled circuit precedent 84 by
holding that “court[s] should not use a ‘sliding scale,’ where a
weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong
showing of materiality, and vice versa.” 85 Finally, Chief Judge
Rader’s opinion for the court further clarified what is needed to
prove specific intent by circumstantial evidence. The court
reiterated the “single most reasonable inference” requirement
implicit in any burden of proof requiring at least a preponderance
of evidence 86 and previously articulated by a Federal Circuit panel
adjustment.”).
82
The quotation marks around “active” reflect the fact that the Federal
Circuit has a number of senior judges who are active in a less technical sense of
the term in that they sit regularly on three-judge panels, helping to decide cases
and to write opinions supporting the court’s decisions.
83
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290; id. at 1296-97 (O’Malley, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (indicating that she concurred with the majority on
everything but the proper approach for “assessing materiality”); id. at 1302
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (observing that disagreement on the proper standard for
materiality “is what divides the court in this case”).
84
Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“While the intent to deceive may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances rather than by direct evidence, the intent necessary to establish
inequitable conduct is based on a sliding scale related to materiality of the
omission.”), overruled in part, Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276; Critikon, Inc. v.
Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“The more material the omission or the misrepresentation, the lower the level
of intent required to establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”), overruled
in part, Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276.
85
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290; id. at 1296-97 (O’Malley, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (indicating that she concurred with the majority on
everything but the proper approach for “assessing materiality”); id. at 1302
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (observing that disagreement on the proper standard for
materiality “is what divides the court in this case”).
86
Id. at 1290. The “single most reasonable inference” standard is implicit in
burdens of proof requiring at least a preponderance of the evidence because, if
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in Star Scientific. 87 The court added that “[t]he absence of a good
faith explanation for withholding a material reference does not, by
itself, prove intent to deceive.” 88
In contrast to the Federal Circuit judges’ basic unanimity on
the proper approach to assessing intent, the eleven judges sharply
split on the question of the proper standard for materiality. 89 A
bare majority of six coalesced behind a new framework for
assessing materiality. 90 The majority pointed to policy concerns to
justify this “judicial reform,” 91 explaining that prior efforts to
restrict inequitable conduct charges through a “higher intent
standard” alone “did not reduce the number of inequitable conduct
cases before the courts and did not cure the problem of
overdisclosure of marginally relevant prior art to the PTO.” 92
The majority’s answer to these continuing concerns was
adoption of a general rule that “the materiality required to establish
inequitable conduct is but-for materiality.” 93 In other words,
alleged misconduct, such as nondisclosure of a prior-art reference,
would, generally speaking, only be considered material for
purposes of an inequitable conduct defense if the USPTO “would
not have allowed a claim” in the issued patent if the misconduct

the facts support a more probable or even just equally probable inference of a
mental state more innocent than “specific intent to deceive,” then the existence
of such specific intent is necessarily no more than fifty percent likely, a ceiling
on the likelihood of specific intent presumably insufficient to support a finding
of specific intent even under a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
87
Supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
88
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
89
See id. at 1296 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reporting “respectfu[l] dissent” from the majority’s holdings on materiality); id.
at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s approach “marks
a significant and . . . unwise departure from [Federal Circuit] precedents”).
90
See id. at 1291 (majority opinion) (“[T]his court adjusts as well the
standard for materiality.”).
91
Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially
Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037,
1038 (2008) (noting in 2008 that, while “legislative reform ha[d] been
thwarted,” “judicial reform” had proceeded).
92
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
93
Id.
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had not occurred. 94
Significantly, however, the majority did not stop with
articulation of the new general requirement of but-for materiality.
The majority qualified the general rule with an explicit exception.
Specifically, the majority stated that “affirmative acts of egregious
misconduct” are effectively material per se. 95 The majority
emphasized that the purpose of this exceptional category was to
give the new overall test for materiality “sufficient flexibility to
capture extraordinary circumstances.” 96 Consistent with this aim,
the majority declined to provide a complete definition of the
category of “affirmative egregious acts.” 97 Instead, the majority
gave an illustrative example of such an act—namely, “the filing of
an unmistakably false affidavit.” 98
III. EPILOGUE
Is the Federal Circuit’s newly formulated approach to assessing
inequitable conduct claims a good one? Of course, it is an
empirical question whether that approach will succeed in
substantially restraining a “plague” of inequitable conduct charges
while maintaining a robust penalty that helps deter misconduct in
dealings with the USPTO. For this empirical question, there is no

94

Id. The test for but-for materiality is apparently an objective one, not a
subjective test tied to the individual idiosyncrasies of an actual, single examiner.
The question appears to be whether a properly acting USPTO examiner,
“giv[ing] claims their broadest reasonable construction” and “apply[ing] the
preponderance of the evidence standard” for rejecting claims, would have
allowed the claim to issue. Id. at 1291-92. Consistent with this objective
understanding of materiality, the majority indicated that, because district courts
use the best rather than the broadest reasonable construction for claims, and
because invalidity of a patent claim must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence in district courts, rather than a mere preponderance of the evidence, “if
a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately
withheld reference, then that reference is necessarily material.” Id. at 1292.
95
Id. at 1292.
96
Id. at 1293.
97
Id.
98
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293.
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quick and easy answer. 99
In the meantime, the new approach to assessing inequitable
conduct outlined by Therasense appears at least to represent a
reasonable and even laudable effort to improve the practical
performance of a problematic body of law. Although
commentators frequently criticize the Federal Circuit for excessive
formalism, the Therasense court explicitly cites real-world policy
concerns to support the change in course that it adopts.100
Additionally, the court cites such policy concerns in an equitable
context where consideration of policy concerns has traditionally
been thought appropriate. 101 The court’s tightening of the
requirement of specific intent was relatively uncontroversial and,
given concerns with uncertainty and overcompliance, quite
defensible. 102 Further, the test for materiality adopted by the court
seeks to strike a reasonable balance between clear guidance and
reserved flexibility by employing a doctrinal arrangement common
in equity: a strong default rule combined with a nontrivial
allowance for exceptions. 103 The new materiality test’s somewhat

99

See Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 27, at 1350 (concluding
that “only time will tell whether the majority’s predictions [of positive effects]
will come to pass”).
100
See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
101
See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 538 (1982) (“In the field of nuisance law,
equity invaded the common law by introducing a comparative weighing of
public values in trespass actions.”); William Murray Tabb, Reconsidering the
Application of Laches in Environmental Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
377, 400 (1990) (“Public interest concerns traditionally have played a key role
in affecting a court’s equitable discretion regarding entitlement and fashioning
of equitable relief.”).
102
See Cotropia, supra note 13, at 777 (arguing for a requirement of
specific intent that is truly separate from that for materiality). But see McGowan,
supra note 2, at 976 (arguing that “the court should reverse its course on
scienter” and “return to a standard of recklessness”).
103
See Mark Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme
Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206 (2012) (contending that, “[i]n deciding whether to
issue injunctions, courts would generally do well by continuing to use the kinds
of structured sets of presumptions and safety valves that have characterized
traditional equitable practice”).
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fuzzily defined exception for “affirmative egregious acts” 104 might
help deter at least the worst forms of abuse not captured by the
general requirement of but-for materiality. 105
In at least one respect, we know that Therasense has been an
almost immediate success. Within two months of the court’s
decision, the USPTO, which had opposed a but-for materiality test
in the en banc proceedings, 106 reversed course and proposed “to
revise [its] materiality standard . . . to match the materiality
standard, as defined in Therasense.” 107 The USPTO’s course
change helps eliminate awkward incongruity between the
USPTO’s definition of an applicant’s duty to disclose and the
Federal Circuit’s definition of what constitutes inequitable
conduct, and elimination of this incongruity has probably made
intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court less likely.
Moreover, Congress has taken its own route to endorsing
something like a but-for materiality test. The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act that became law in September 2011 provides
for a process of “supplemental examination” by which a patentee
can effectively inoculate a patent against charges of inequitable
conduct by resubmitting the patent for reexamination based on
corrected information. 108 Under the Therasense rubric, successful
104

As Judge Bryson’s dissent points out, “it is often difficult to draw a line
between nondisclosure and affirmative misrepresentation,” “not to mention . . .
between ‘egregious’ misconduct and misconduct that is assertedly less than
‘egregious.’” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1313 n.3 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
105
See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 103, at 237-38 (“It is
foundational that equity must be open textured in light of the ability of parties to
opportunistically evade legal obligations.”).
106
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (describing the
USPTO as “persuasively argu[ing] in its amicus brief [that] the ‘but for’
standard for materiality is too restrictive”).
107
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Revision of the Materiality to
Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43631 (proposed July 21, 2011).
108
See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention
Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (describing the “supplemental examination”
provision as “a patent amnesty program”). The act expressly provides that “[a]
patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was
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passage of a patent through such a supplemental examination
might be viewed as effectively establishing that corrected errors in
disclosure were not but-for material and thus not proper grounds
for a holding of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.
With such USPTO and congressional actions appearing
effectively to bolster aspects of the Therasense approach, the
Federal Circuit’s new approach to determining whether there is
inequitable conduct—including its relatively uncontroversial
tightening of the specific intent requirement and its more
controversial tightening of the materiality requirement—appears
relatively secure. Will the Federal Circuit’s Therasense
prescription suffice to correct or, at least, substantially mitigate the
inequitable conduct defense’s faults? There seems at least a decent
chance that it will. But patent law’s Falstaff—the inequitable
conduct defense—has proven irrepressible in the past. We will
have to wait and see the outcome of the Federal Circuit’s latest
admonition that this Falstaff should “[m]ake less thy body . . . and
more thy grace.” 109

incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was considered,
reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.”
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284, 326
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1)).
109
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 2 HENRY IV 5.5, l. 50, in NORTON
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1374 (Henry V’s closing admonition to Falstaff).

